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Abstract
We consider the celebrated Blackwell Approachability Theorem for two-player games with vector
payoffs. We show that Blackwell’s result is equivalent, via efficient reductions, to the existence of “no-
regret” algorithms for Online Linear Optimization. Indeed, we show that any algorithm for one such
problem can be efficiently converted into an algorithm for the other. We provide a useful application of
this reduction: the first efficient algorithm for calibrated forecasting.
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1 Introduction
A typical assumption in game theory, and indeed in most of economics, is that an agent’s goal is to optimize
a scalar-valued payoff function–a person’s wealth, for example. Such scalar-valued utility functions are
the basis for much work in learning and Statistics too, where one hopes to maximize prediction accuracy
or minimize expected loss. Towards this end, a natural goal is to prove a guarantee on some algorithm’s
minimum expected payoff (or maximum reward).
In 1956, David Blackwell posed an intriguing question: what guarantee can we hope to achieve when
playing a two-player game with a vector-valued payoff, particularly when the opponent is potentially an
adversary? For the case of scalar payoffs, as in a two-player zero-sum game, we already have a concise
guarantee by way of Von Neumann’s minimax theorem: either player has a fixed oblivious strategy that is
effectively the “best possible”, in that this player could do no better even with knowledge of the opponent’s
randomized strategy in advance. This result is equivalent to strong duality for linear programming.
When our payoffs are non-scalar quantities, it does not make sense to ask “can we earn at least x?”.
Instead, we would like to ask “can we guarantee that our vector payoff lies in some convex set S”? In
this case, the story is more difficult, and Blackwell observed that an oblivious strategy does not suffice—in
short, we do not achieve “duality” for vector-payoff games. What Blackwell was able to prove is that this
negative result applies only for one-shot games. In his celebrated Approachability Theorem [3], one can
achieve a duality statment in the limit when the game is played repeatedly, where the player may learn from
his opponent’s prior actions. Blackwell actually constructed an algorithm (that is, an adaptive strategy) with
the guarantee that the average payoff vector “approaches” S, hence the name of the theorem.
Blackwell Approachability has the flavor of learning in repeated games, a topic which has received
much interest. In particular, there are a wealth of recent results on so-called no-regret learning algorithms
for making repeated decisions given an arbitrary (and potentially adversarial) sequence of cost functions.
The first no-regret algorithm for a “discrete action” setting was given in a seminal paper by James Hannan
in 1956 [10]. That same year, David Blackwell pointed out [2] that his Approachability result leads, as a
special case, to an algorithm with essentially the same low-regret guarantee proven by Hannan.
Blackwell thus found an intriguing connection between repeated vector-payoff games and low-regret
learning, a connection that we shall explore in greater detail in the present work. Indeed, we will show
that the relationship goes much deeper than Blackwell had originally supposed. We prove that, in fact,
Blackwell’s Approachability Theorem is equivalent, in a very strong sense, to no-regret learning, for the
particular setting of so-called “Online Linear Optimization”. Precisely, we show that any no-regret algorithm
can be converted into an algorithm for Approachability and vice versa. This is algorithmic equivalence is
achieved via the use of conic duality: if our goal is low-regret learning in a cone K, we can convert this into
a problem of approachability of the dual cone K0, and vice versa.
This equivalence provides a range of benefits and one such is “calibrated forecasting”. The goal of a
calibrated forecaster is to ensure that sequential probability predictions of repeated events are “unbiased” in
the following sense: when the weatherman says “30% chance of rain”, it should actually rain roughly three
times out of ten. The problem of calibrated forecasting was reduced to Blackwell’s Approachability Theo-
rem by Foster [7], and a handful of other calibration techniques have been proposed, yet none have provided
any efficiency guarantees on the strategy. Using a similar reduction from calibration to approachability, and
by carefully constructing the reduction from approachability to online linear optimization, we achieve the
first efficient calibration algorithm.
Related work There is by now vast literature on all three main topics of this paper: approachability, online
learning and calibration, see [4] for an excellent exposition. The relation between the three areas is not as
well-understood.
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Blackwell himself noted that approachability implies no regret algorithms in the discrete setting. How-
ever, as we show hereby, the full power of approachability extends to a much more general framework of
online linear optimization, which has only recently been explored (see [12] for a survey) and shown to give
the first efficient algorithms for a host of problems (e.g. [1, 6]). Perhaps more significant, we also prove the
reverse direction - online linear optimization exactly captures the power of approachability. Previously, it
was considered by many to be strictly stronger than regret minimization.
Calibration is a fundamental notion in prediction theory and has found numerous applications in eco-
nomics and learning. Dawid [5] was the first to define calibration, with numerous algorithms later given by
Foster and Vohra [8], Fudenberg and Levine [9], Hart and Mas-Colell [11] and more. Foster has given a
calibration algorithm based on approachability [7]. There are numerous definitions of calibration in the lit-
erature, mostly asymptotic. In this paper we give precise finite-time rates of calibration and show them to be
optimal. Furthermore, we give the first efficient algorithm for calibration: attaining ε-calibration (formally
defined later) required a running time of poly(1ε ) for all previous algorithms, whereas our algorithm runs in
time proportional to log 1ε .
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Blackwell Approachability
A vector-valued game is defined by a pair of convex compact sets X ⊂ Rn,Y ⊂ Rm and a biaffine mapping
` : X × Y → Rd; that is, for any α ∈ [0, 1] and any x1,x2 ∈ X , y1,y2 ∈ Y , we have `(αx1 + (1 −
α)x2,y) = α`(x1,y) + (1− α)`(x2,y), and `(x, αy1 + (1− α)y2) = α`(x,y1) + (1− α)`(x,y2). We
consider `(x,y) to be the “payoff vector” when Player 1 plays strategy x and Player 2 plays strategy y. We
consider this game from the perspective of Player 1, whom we will often refer to as “the player”, while we
refer to Player 2 as “the adversary”.
In a scalar-valued game, the natural question to ask is “how much can a player expect to gain/lose
(in expectation) against a worst-case adversary?” With d-dimensional payoffs, of course, we don’t have
a notion of ‘more’ or ‘less’, and hence this question does not make sense. As Blackwell pointed out [3],
the natural question to consider is “can we guarantee that the payoff vector lies in a given (convex) set S?”
Notice that this formulation dovetails nicely with the original goal in scalar-valued game, in the following
way. Take any halfspace H ⊂ Rd, where H is parameterized by a vector v and a constant c, namely
H = {z ∈ Rd : z · v ≥ c}. Then the question “can we guarantee that `(·, ·) lies in H?” is equivalent to “can
the player expect to gain at least c in the scalar-valued game defined by `′(x,y) := `(x,y) · v?”
Given that we would like to receive payoff vectors that lie within S, let us define three separate notions
of achievement towards this goal.
Definition 1. Let S be a convex set of Rd.
• We say that a set S is satisfiable if there exists a strategy x ∈ X such that for any y ∈ Y , `(x,y) ∈ S.
• We say that a set is S halfspace-satisfiable if, for any halfspace H ⊇ S, H is satisfiable.
• We say that a set is S is response-satisfiable if, for any y ∈ Y , there exists a xy ∈ X such that
`(xy,y) ∈ S.
Among these three conditions the first, satisfiability, is the strongest. Indeed, it says that the player
has an oblivious strategy which always provides the desired guarantee, namely that the payoff is in S.
The second condition, response-satisfiability, is much weaker and says we can achieve the same guarantee
provided we observe the opponent’s strategy in advance. We will also make use of the final condition,
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halfspace-satisfiability, which is also a weak condition, although we shall show it is equivalent to response-
satisifiability.
Of course, a scalar-valued game is a particular case of a vector-valued game. What is interesting is that,
for this special case, the condition of satisfiability is in fact no stronger than response-satisfiability for the
case when S has the form [c,∞). Indeed, this fact can be view as the celebrated Minimax Theorem.
Theorem 1 (Von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem [14]). For X and Y the n-dimensional and m-dimensional
probability simplexes, and with scalar-valued `(·, ·), the set S = [c,∞) is satisfiable if and only if it is
response-satisfiable.
We will also make use of a more general version of the Minimax Theorem, due to Maurice Sion.
Theorem 2 (Sion, 1958 [15]). Given convex compact setsX ⊂ Rn,Y ⊂ Rm, and a function f : X×Y → R
convex and concave in its first and second arguments respectively, we have
inf
x∈X
sup
y∈Y
f(x,y) = sup
y∈Y
inf
x∈X
f(x,y)
One might hope that the analog of Theorem 1 for vector-valued games would also hold true. Unfortu-
nately, this is not the case. Consider the following easy example: X = Y := [0, 1], the payoff is simply
`(x, y) := (x, y) for x, y ∈ [0, 1], and the set in question is S := {(z, z) ∀z ∈ [0, 1]}. Response-
satisfiability is easy to establish, simply use the response strategy xy = y. But satisfiability can not be
achieved: there is certainly no generic x for which (x, y) ∈ S for all y.
At first glance, it seems unfortunate that we can not achieve a similar notion of duality for games with
vector-valued payoffs. What Blackwell showed, however, is that the story is not quite so bad: we can obtain a
version of Theorem 1 for a weaker notion of satisfiability. In particular, Blackwell proved that, so long as we
can play this game repeatedly, then there exists an adaptive algorithm for playing this game that guarantees
satisfiability for the average payoff vector in the limit. Blackwell coined the term approachability.
Definition 2. Consider a vector-valued game `(·, ·) and a convex set S. Imagine we have some “learning”
algorithm A which, given a sequence y1,y2, . . . ∈ Y , produces a sequence x1,x2, ... via the rule xt ←
A(y1,y2, . . . ,yt−1). For any T define1 the distance of A to be
DT (A;S,y1, . . . ,yT ) ≡ dist
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(xt,yt), S
)
,
where here dist(, ) mean the usual notion `2-distance between a point and a set. For a given vector-valued
game and a convex set S, we say that S is approachable if there exists a learning algorithm A such that,
lim sup
T→∞
DT (A;S,y1, . . . ,yT ) = 0 for any sequence y1,y2, . . . ∈ Y
Approachability is a curious property: it allows the player to repeat the game and learn from his op-
ponent, and only requires that the average payoff satisfy the desired guarantee in the long run. Blackwell
showed that response-satisfiability, which does not imply satisfiability, does imply approachability.
Theorem 3 (Blackwell’s Approachability Theorem [3]). Any closed convex set S is approachable if and
only if it is response-satisfiable.
This version of the theorem, which appears in Evan-Dar et al. [6], is not the one usually attributed
to Blackwell, although this is essentially one of his corollaries. His main theorem states that halfspace-
satisfiability, rather than response-satisfiability, implies satisfiability. However, these two weaker satisfiabil-
ity conditions are equivalent:
1We may simply write DT (A) when S and y1, . . . ,yT are clear from context.
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Lemma 1. Given a biaffine function `(·, ·) and any closed convex set S, S is response-satisfiable if and only
if it is halfspace-satisfiable.
Proof. We will show each direction separately.
=⇒ Assume that S is response-satisfiable. Hence, for any y there is an xy such that `(xy,y) ∈ S. Now
take any halfspace H ⊃ S parameterized by θ, c, that is H = {z : 〈θ, z〉 ≤ c}. Then let us define a
scalar-valued game with payoff function
f(x,y) = 〈θ, `(x,y)〉.
Notice that H ⊃ S implies that θ · z ≤ c for all z ∈ S. Combining this with the definition of
response-satisfiability, we see that
sup
y∈Y
inf
x∈X
f(x,y) ≤ sup
y∈Y
f(xy,y) ≤ c.
By Sion’s Theorem (Theorem 2), it follows that infx∈X supy∈Y f(x,y) ≤ c. By compactness of
X , we can choose the minimizer x∗ of this optimization. Notice that, for any y ∈ Y , we have that
f(x∗,y) ≤ c by construction, and hence `(x∗,y) ∈ H . H is thus satisfiable, as desired.
⇐= Assume that S is not response-satisfiable. Hence, there must exists some y0 such that `(x,y0) /∈ S
for every x. Consider the set U := {`(x,y0) for all x ∈ X} and notice that U is convex since X is
convex and `(·,y0) is affine. Furthermore, because S is convex and S ∩ U = ∅ by assumption, there
must exist some halfspace H dividing the two, that is S ⊂ H and H ∩ U = ∅. By construction, we
see that for any x, `(x,y0) /∈ H and hence H is not satisfiable. It follows immediately that S is not
halfspace-satisfiable.
For the sake of simplicity, and for natural connection to the Minimax Theorem, we prefer Theorem 3.
However, for certain results, it will be preferable to appeal to the halfspace-satisfiablility condition instead.
2.2 Online Linear Optimization
In the setting Online Linear Optimization, the “learner” makes decisions from a bounded convex decision
set K in some Hilbert space. On each of a sequence of rounds, the decision maker chooses a point xt ∈ K,
and is then given a linear cost function ft ∈ F , where F is some bounded set of cost functions, and cost
〈ft,xt〉 is paid. The standard measure of performance in this setting, called regret, is defined as follows.
Definition 3. The regret of learning algorithm Ł is
RegretT (Ł) = max
f1,...,fT∈F
[
T∑
t=1
〈ft,xt〉 −min
x∈K
T∑
t=1
〈ft,x〉
]
We say that Ł is a no-regret learning algorithm when it holds that RegretT (Ł) = O(
√
T ) = o(T ).
We state a well-known result:
Theorem 4. For any bounded decision set K ⊂ H, there exists a no-regret algorithm on K.
Later in this paper, we shall use the Gradient Descent algorithm of Zinkevich [16]. Ultimately, our goal
will be to show that this theorem is equivalent to Theorem 3.
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2.3 Convex cones in Hilbert space
Definition 4. A set X ⊂ Rd is a cone if it is closed under addition and multiplication by nonnegative
scalars. Given any set K ⊂ H, define cone(K) := {αx : α ∈ R+,x ∈ K}, which is a cone in H. Also,
given any set in Hilbert space C ⊂ H, we can define the polar cone of C as
C0 := {θ ∈ H : 〈θ,x〉 ≤ 0 for all x ∈ C}
We state a few simple facts on convex sets:
Lemma 2. If C is a convex cone then (1) (C0)0 = C and (2) supporting hyperplanes in C0 correspond to
points x ∈ C, and vice versa. That is, given any supporting hyperplane H of C0, H can be written exactly
as {θ ∈ Rd : 〈θ,x〉 = 0} for some vector x ∈ C that is unique up to scaling.
The distance to a cone can conveniently be measure via a “dual formulation,” as we now show.
Lemma 3. For every convex cone C in Hilbert space
dist(x, C) = max
θ∈C0,‖θ‖≤1
〈θ,x〉 (1)
We need to measure distance to K after we make it into a cone via “lifting”.
Lemma 4. Consider a convex set K ⊆ H in Hilbert space and x /∈ K. Let ‖K‖ := maxy∈K ‖y‖. Define C
to be the cone generated by the lifting of K, that is C = cone({1} ⊕ K). Then
dist(1⊕ x, C) ≤ dist(x,K) ≤ (1 + ‖K‖) · dist(1⊕ x, C) (2)
3 Duality of Approachability and Low-Regret Learning
We recall the notion of an approachability algorithmA from Section 2.1. Formally, we imagineA as a func-
tion that observes a sequence of opponent plays y1, . . . ,yt−1 ∈ Y and chooses xt ← A(y1,y2, . . . ,yt−1)
from X , with the goal that 1T
∑T
t=1 `(xt,yt) approaches a convex set S. The convex decision sets X ,Y , the
payoff function `(·, ·), and the set S are all known in advance to A, and hence we may also write A`,S for
the algorithm tuned for these particular choices.
Equivalently, we consider a no-regret algorithm Ł as a function that observes a sequence of linear cost
functions f1, . . . , ft−1 and returns a point xt ← Ł(f1, . . . , ft−1) from the decision set K. The goal here is to
achieve the regret
∑T
t=1〈ft,xt〉 −minx∈K
∑T
t=1〈ft,x〉 that is sublinear in T . The bounded convex set K is
known to the algorithm in advance, and hence we may write AK for the algorithm tuned for this particular
set K.
We now prove two claims, showing the equivalence of Blackwell and Online Linear Optimization.
Precisely what we will show is the following. Assume we are given (A) an instance of an Online Linear
Optimization problem and (B) an algorithm that achieves the goals of Blackwell’s Approachability Theorem.
Then we shall show that we can convert the algorithm for (B) to achieve a no-regret algorithm for (A).
Lemma 5. For S defined in Algorithm 1, there exists an approachability algorithm A for S; that is,
DT (A;S)→ 0 as T →∞.
Proposition 1. The reduction defined in Algorithm 1, for any input algorithm A, produces an OLO algo-
rithm Ł such that Regret(Ł)T ≤ (1 + ‖K‖)DT (A).
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Algorithm 1 Reduction of Approachability Alg. A to Online Linear Optimization Alg. Ł
Input: Convex decision set K ⊂ Rd
Input: Sequence of cost functions f1, f2, . . . , fT ∈ Rd
Input: Approachability algorithm A
Set: Two-player vector-payoff game ` : K × Rd → Rd+1 as `(x, f) = 〈f ,x〉 ⊕ −f
Set: Approach set S := cone(1⊕K)0
for t = 1, . . . , T do
Let: Ł(f1, . . . , ft−1) := A`,S(f1, . . . , ft−1)
Receive: cost function ft
end for
Algorithm 2 Conversion of Online Linear Optimization Alg. Ł to Approachability Alg. A
Input: Convex compact decision sets X ⊂ Rn and Y ⊂ Rm
Input: Biaffine vector-payoff function `(·, ·) : X × Y → Rd
Input: Approaching Set S ⊂ {1} × Rd−1
Input: Online Linear Optimization algorithm Ł
Set: K = cone(S)0 ∩B1
for t = 1, . . . , T do
Query: θt ← ŁK(f1, . . . , ft−1), where fs ← −`(xs,ys)
Compute: xt ∈ X so that 〈θt, `(xt,y)〉 ≤ 0 for any y ∈ Y // Halfspace oracle
Let: A(y1, . . . ,yt−1) := xt
Receive: yt ∈ Y
end for
Now onto the second reduction. The construction in Algorithm 2 attempts the following. Assume we are
given (A) an instance of a vector-payoff game and an approach set S and (B) a low-regret OLO algorithm.
Then we shall show that we can convert the algorithm for (B) to achieve approachability for (A).
Proposition 2. The reduction in Algorithm 2 produces an approachability algorithm A with distance
bounded by
DT (A) ≤ (1 + ‖S‖)Regret(Ł)
T
as long as S is halfspace-satisfiable with respect to `(·, ·).
4 Efficient Calibration via Approachability and OLO
Imagine a sequence of binary outcomes, say ‘rain’ or ‘shine’ on a given day, and imagine a forecaster, say
the weatherman, that wants to predict the probability of this outcome on each day. A natural question to ask
is, on the days when the weatherman actually predicts “30% chance of rain”, does it actually rain (roughly)
30% of the time? This exactly the problem of calibrated forecasting which we now discuss.
There have been a range of definitions of calibration given throughout the literature, some equivalent
and some not, but from a computational viewpoint there are significant differences. We thus give a clean
definition of calibration, first introduced by Foster [7], which is convenient to asses computationally.
We let y1, y2, . . . ∈ {0, 1} be a sequence of outcomes, and p1, p2, . . . ∈ [0, 1] a sequence of probability
predictions by a forecaster. We define for every T and every probability interval [a, b], where 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1,
7
the quantities
nT (p, ε) :=
T∑
t=1
I[pt ∈ (p− ε/2, p+ ε/2)], ρT (p, ε) :=
∑T
t=1 ytI[pt ∈ (p− ε/2, p+ ε/2)]
nT (p, ε)
.
The quantity ρT (p− ε/2, p+ ε/2) should be interpreted as the empirical frequency of yt = 1, up to round
T , on only those rounds where the forecaster’s prediction was “roughly” equal to p. The goal of calibration,
of course, is to have this empirical frequency ρT (p, ε) be close to the estimated frequency p, which leads us
to the following definition.
Definition 5. Let the (`1, ε)-calibration rate for forecaster A be
CεT (A) =
bε−1c∑
i=0
nT (iε, ε)
T
|iε− ρT (iε, ε)| − ε
2
We say that a forecaster is (`1, ε)-calibrated ifCεT (A) = o(1). This in turn implies lim supT→∞CεT (A) = 0.
This definition emphasizes that we can ignore an interval (p−ε/2, p+ε/2) in cases when our forecaster
“rarely” makes predictions within this interval—more precisely, when we forecast within this interval with a
frequency that is sublinear in T . Another important feature of this definition is the constant ε/2 - which is an
artifact of the discretization by ε. This is the smallest constant which allows for lim supT→∞CεT (A) = 0.
We given an equivalent and alternative characterization of this definition: let the calibration vector at
time T denoted cT be given by: cT (i) =
nT (iε,ε)
T |iε− ρT (iε, ε)|
Claim 1. The (`1, ε)-calibration rate is equal to the distance of the calibration vector to the `1ball of radius
ε/2:
CεT = dist(cT , B1(ε/2))
Proof. Notice that:
dist1(x, B1(ε/2)) := min
y:‖y‖1≤ε/2
‖x− y‖1 = −ε/2 + ‖x‖1
where the second equality follows by noting that an optimally chosen y will lie in the same quadrant as
x.
A standard reduction in the literature (see e.g. [4]) shows that ε-calibration and full calibration are
essentially the same (in the sense that an ε-calibrated algorithm can be converted to a calibrated one). For
simplicity we consider only ε-calibration henceforth.
4.1 Existence of Calibrated Forecaster via Blackwell Approachability
A surprising fact is that it is possible to achieve calibration even when the outcome sequence {yt} is chosen
by an adversary, although this requires a randomized strategy of the forecaster. Algorithms for calibrated
forecasting under adversarial conditions have been given in Foster and Vohra [8], Fudenberg and Levine [9],
and Hart and Mas-Colell [11].
Interestingly, the calibration problem was reduced to Blackwell’s Approachability Theorem in a short
paper by Foster in 1999 [7]. Foster’s reduction uses Blackwell’s original theorem, proving that a given set
is halfspace-satisfiable, in particular by providing a construction for each such halfspace. Here, we provide
a reduction to Blackwell Approachability using the response-satisfiability condition, i.e. via Theorem 3,
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which is both significantly easier and more intuitive than Blackwell2. We also show, using the reduction to
Online Linear Optimization from the previous section, how to achieve the most efficient known algorithm
for calibration by taking advantage of the Online Gradient Descent algorithm of Zinkevich [16], using the
results of Section 3.
We now describe the construction that allows us to reduce calibration to approachability. For any ε > 0
we will show how to construct an (`1, ε)-calibrated forecaster. Notice that from here, it is straightforward
to produce a well-calibrated forecaster [8]. For simplicity, assume ε = 1/m for some positive integer m.
On each round t, a forecaster will now randomly predict a probability pt ∈ {0/m, 1/m, 2/m, . . . , (m −
1)/m, 1}, according to the distribution wt, that is Pr(pt = i/m) = wt(i). We now define a vector-valued
game. Let the player choose wt ∈ X := ∆m+1, and the adversary choose yt ∈ Y := [0, 1], and the payoff
vector will be
`(wt, yt) :=
〈
wt(0)
(
yt − 0
m
)
,wt(1)
(
yt − 1
m
)
, . . . ,wt(m)(yt − 1)
〉
(3)
Lemma 6. Consider the vector-valued game described above and let S, the `1 ball of radius ε/2. If we
have a strategy for choosing wt that guarantees approachability of S, that is 1T
∑T
t=1 `(wt, yt) → S, then
a randomized forecaster that selects pt according to wt is (`1, ε)-calibrated with high probability.
The proof of this lemma is straightforward, and is similar to the construction in Foster [7]. The vector
1
T
∑T
t=1 `(wt, yt) is simply the expectation of (`1, ε)-calibration vector at T . Since each pt is drawn inde-
pendently, by standard concentration arguments we can see that if 1T
∑T
t=1 `(wt, yt) is close to the `1ball of
radius ε/2, then the (`1, ε)-calibration vector is close to the ε/2 ball with high probability.
We can now apply Theorem 3 to prove the existence of a calibrated forecaster.
Theorem 5. For the vector-valued game defined in (3), the `1 ball of radius ε/2 is response-satisfiable and,
hence, approachable.
Proof. To show response-satisfiability, we need only show that, for every strategy y ∈ [0, 1] played by the
adversary, there is a strategy w ∈ ∆m for which `(w, y) ∈ S. This can be achieved by simply setting i
so as to minimize |iε − y|, which can always be made smaller than ε/2. We then choose our distribution
w ∈ ∆m+1 to be a point mass on i, that is we set w(i) = 1 and w(j) = 0 for all j 6= i. Then `(w, y) is
identically 0 everywhere except the ith coordinate, which has the value y−i/m. By construction, y−i/m ∈
[−1/m, 1/m], and we are done.
4.2 Efficient Algorithm for Calibration via Online Linear Optimization
We now show how the results in the previous Section lead to the first efficient algorithm for calibrated
forecasting. The previous theorem provides a natural existence proof for Calibration, but it does not imme-
diately provide us with a simple and efficient algorithm. We proceed according to the reduction outlined in
the previous section to prove:
Theorem 6. There exists a (`1, ε)-calibration algorithm that runs in timeO(log 1ε ) per iteration and satisfies
CεT = O
(
1√
εT
)
The reduction developed in Proposition 2 has some flexibility, and we shall modify it for the purposes
of this problem. The objects we shall need, as well as the required conditions, are as follows:
1. A convex set K
2A similar existence proof was discovered concurrently by Mannor and Stoltz [13]
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2. An efficient learning algorithm A which, for any sequence f1, f2, . . ., can select a sequence of points
θ1,θ2, . . . ∈ K with the guarantee that
∑T
t=1〈ft,θt〉 −minθ∈K
∑T
t=1〈ft,θ〉 = o(T ). For the reduc-
tion, we shall set ft ← −`(wt, yt).
3. An efficient oracle that can select a particular wt ∈ X for each θt ∈ K with the guarantee that
dist
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(wt, yt), S
)
≤ 1
T
(
T∑
t=1
〈−`(wt, yt),θt〉 −min
θ∈K
T∑
t=1
〈−`(wt, yt),θ〉
)
(4)
where the function dist() can be with respect to any norm.
The Setup Let K = B∞(1) = {θ ∈ Rd : ‖θ‖∞ ≤ 1} be the unit cube. This is an appropriate choice
because we can write the `1distance to B1(ε/2) (the `1ball of radius ε/2) as
dist1(x, B1(ε/2)) := min
y:‖y‖1≤ε/2
‖x− y‖1 = −ε/2 + ‖x‖1 = −ε/2− min
θ:‖θ‖∞≤1
〈−x,θ〉, (5)
where the second equality follows by noting that an optimally chosen y will lie in the same quadrant as x.
Furthermore, we shall construct our oracle mapping θ 7→ w with the following guarantee: 〈`(w, y),θ〉 ≤
ε/2 for any y. Using this guarantee, and if we plug in x = 1T
∑T
t=1 `(wt, yt) (5), we arrive at:
dist1
(∑T
t=1 `(wt, yt)
T
,B1(ε/2)
)
= −ε/2− min
θ:‖θ‖∞≤1
〈
−∑Tt=1 `(wt, yt)
T
,θ
〉
≤ 1
T
(
T∑
t=1
〈−`(wt, yt),θt〉 −min
θ∈K
T∑
t=1
〈−`(wt, yt),θ〉
)
This is precisely the necessary guarantee (4).
Constructing the Oracle We now turn our attention to designing the required oracle in an efficient manner.
In particular, given any θ with ‖θ‖∞ ≤ 1 we must construct w ∈ ∆m+1 so that 〈`(w, y),θ〉 ≤ ε/2 for any
y. The details of this oracle are given in Algorithm 3. It is straightforward why, in the final else condition,
Algorithm 3 Constructing w from θ
Input: θ such that ‖θ‖∞ ≤ 1
if θ(0) ≤ 0 then
w← δ0 // That is, choose w to place all weight on the 0th coordinate
else if θ(m) ≥ 0 then
w← δm // That is, choose w to place all weight on the last coordinate
else
Binary search θ to find coordinate i such that θ(i) > 0 and θ(i+ 1) ≤ 0
w← θ(i)−1
θ(i)−1−θ(i+1)−1 δi +
−θ(i+1)−1
θ(i)−1−θ(i+1)−1 δi+1
end if
Return w
there must be such a pair of coordinates i, i+ 1 satisfying the condition. We need not be concerned with the
case that θ(i+ 1) = 0, where we can simply define 0∞ = 0 and
∞
∞ = 1 leading to w← δi+1. It is also clear
that, with the binary search, this algorithm requires at most O(logm) = O(log 1/ε) computation.
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In order to prove that this construction is valid we need to check the condition that, for any y ∈ {0, 1},
〈`(w, y),θ〉 ≤ ε/2; or more precisely, ∑mi=1 θ(i)w(i) (y − im) ≤ ε/2. Recalling that m = 1/ε, this is
trivially checked for the case when θ(1) ≤ 0 or θ(m) ≥ 0. Otherwise, we have
〈`(w, y),θ〉 = θ(i) θ(i)
−1
θ(i)−1 − θ(i+ 1)−1
(
y − i
m
)
+ θ(i+ 1)
−θ(i+ 1)−1
θ(i)−1 − θ(i+ 1)−1
(
y − i+ 1
m
)
=
1
θ(i)−1 − θ(i+ 1)−1
1
m
≤ max(|θ(i)|, |θ(i+ 1)|)
2
ε ≤ ε
2
The Learning Algorithm The final piece is to construct an efficient learning algorithm which leads to
vanishing regret. That is, we need to construct a sequence of θt’s in the unit cube (denoted B∞(1)) so that
T∑
t=1
〈`t,θt〉 − min
θ∈B∞(1)
T∑
t=1
〈`t,θ〉 = o(T ),
where `t := `(wt, yt). There are a range of possible no-regret algorithms available, but we use the one
given by Zinkevich known commonly as Online Gradient Descent [16]. The details are given in Algo-
rithm 4. This algorithm can indeed be implemented efficiently, requiring only O(1) computation on each
Algorithm 4 Online Gradient Descent
Input: convex set K ⊂ Rd
Initialize: θ1 = 0
Set Parameter: η = O(T−1/2)
for t = 1, . . . , T do
Receive `t
θ′t+1 ← θt − η`t // Gradient Descent Step
θt+1 ← Project2(θ′t+1,K) // L2 Projection Step
end for
round and O(min{m,T}) memory. The main advantage is that the vectors `t are generated via our oracle
above, and these vectors are sparse, having only at most two nonzero coordinates. Hence, the Gradient
Descent Step requires only O(1) computation. In addition, the Projection Step can also be performed in an
efficient manner. Since we assume that θt ∈ B∞(1), the updated point θ′t+1 can violate at most two of the
L∞ constraints of the ball B∞(1). An `2 projection onto the cube requires simply rounding the violated
coordinates into [−1, 1]. The number of non-zero elements in θ can increase by at most two every itera-
tion, and storing θ is the only state that online gradient descent needs to store, hence the algorithm can be
implemented with O(min{T,m}) memory. We thus arrive at an efficient no-regret algorithm for choosing
θt.
Proof of Theorem 6. Here we have bounded the distance directly by the regret, using equation (4), which
tells us that the calibration rate is bounded by the regret of the online learning algorithm. Online Gradient
Descent guarantees the regret to be no more than DG
√
T , where D is the `2 diameter of the set, and G is
the `2-norm of the largest cost vector. For the ball B∞(1), the diameter D =
√
1
ε , and we can bound the
norm of our loss vectors by G =
√
2. Hence:
CεT = dist(cT , B1(ε/2)) ≤
RegretT
T
≤ GD√
T
= O
(
1√
εT
)
(6)
11
References
[1] Jacob Abernethy, Elad Hazan, and Alexander Rakhlin. Competing in the dark: An efficient algorithm
for bandit linear optimization. In COLT, pages 263–274, 2008.
[2] D. Blackwell. Controlled random walks. In Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathemati-
cians, volume 3, pages 336–338, 1954.
[3] D. Blackwell. An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs. Pacific Journal of Mathematics,
6(1):18, 1956.
[4] Nicolo Cesa-Bianchi and Gbor Lugosi. Prediction, Learning, and Games. 2006.
[5] A. Dawid. The well-calibrated Bayesian. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 77:605–613,
1982.
[6] E. Even-Dar, R. Kleinberg, S. Mannor, and Y. Mansour. Online learning for global cost functions.
2009.
[7] D. P Foster. A proof of calibration via blackwell’s approachability theorem. Games and Economic
Behavior, 29(1-2):7378, 1999.
[8] D. P Foster and R. V Vohra. Asymptotic calibration. Biometrika, 85(2):379, 1998.
[9] D. Fudenberg and D. K Levine. An easier way to calibrate* 1. Games and economic behavior, 29(1-
2):131137, 1999.
[10] J. Hannan. Approximation to Bayes risk in repeated play. Contributions to the Theory of Games,
3:97–139, 1957.
[11] S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell. A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium. Economet-
rica, 68(5):11271150, 2000.
[12] Elad Hazan. The convex optimization approach to regret minimization. In To appear in Optimization
for Machine Learning. MIT Press, 2010.
[13] Shie Mannor and Gilles Stoltz. A Geometric Proof of Calibration. arXiv, Dec 2009.
[14] J. Von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, H. W Kuhn, and A. Rubinstein. Theory of games and economic
behavior. Princeton university press Princeton, NJ, 1947.
[15] M. Sion. On general minimax theorems. Pacific J. Math, 8(1):171–176, 1958.
[16] M. Zinkevich. Online convex programming and generalized infinitesimal gradient ascent. In MA-
CHINE LEARNING-INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP THEN CONFERENCE-, volume 20, page 928,
2003.
12
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3. We need two simple observations. Define piC(x) as the projection of x onto C. Then
clearly, for any x,
dist(x, C) = ‖x− piC(x)‖ (7)
〈x− piC(x),y〉 ≤ 0 ∀y ∈ C and hence x− piC(x) ∈ C0 (8)
〈x− piC(x), piC(x)〉 = 0 (9)
Given any θ ∈ C0 with ‖θ‖ ≤ 1, since piC(x) ∈ C we have that
〈θ,x〉 ≤ 〈θ,x− piC(x)〉 ≤ ‖θ‖‖x− piC(x)‖ ≤ ‖x− piC(x)‖,
which immediately implies that maxθ∈C0,‖θ‖≤1〈θ,x〉 ≤ dist(x, C). Furthermore, by selecting θ =
x−piC(x)
‖x−piC(x)‖ which has norm one and, by (7), is in C
0, we see that
max
θ∈C0,‖θ‖≤1
〈θ,x〉 ≥
〈
x− piC(x)
‖x− piC(x)‖ ,x
〉
=
〈
x− piC(x)
‖x− piC(x)‖ ,x− piC(x)
〉
= ‖x− piC(x)‖,
which implies that maxθ∈C0,‖θ‖≤1〈θ,x〉 ≥ dist(x, C) and hence we are done.
Proof of Lemma 4. Since dist(1 ⊕ x, {1} × K) = dist(x,K) and {1} ⊕ K ⊂ C, the first inequality
follows immediately.
For the second inequality, let y = 1 ⊕ x and let w,v be the closest points to y in C and K respec-
tively. Consider the plane determined by these three points, as depicted in figure 1. Notice that, by triangle
v
1
0
1 y
w
Figure 1: The ratio of distances to K and the cone is the same as the ratio between ‖v‖ and one.
similarity, we have that
‖v‖ = ‖v‖‖1⊕ 0‖ =
‖y − v‖
‖y −w‖ =
dist(y, {1} ⊕ K)
dist(y, C)
Of course, v ∈ K and hence ‖v‖ ≤ ‖{1} ⊕ K‖ ≤ 1 + ‖K‖. The result follows immediately.
Proof of Lemma 5. The existence of an approachability algorithm is established by Blackwell’s Approach-
ability Theorem (Theorem 3), as long as we can guaranteed the response-satisfiability condition. Precisely,
we must show that, for any f , there is some xf ∈ K such that `(xf , f) = 〈f ,xf 〉 ⊕ −f ∈ cone(1 ⊕ K)0.
Recall that θ ∈ cone(1⊕K)0 if and only if 〈θ, z〉 ≤ 0 for every z ∈ cone(1⊕K). Observe that it suffices
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to restrict to only the set generating the cone, that is θ ∈ cone(1 ⊕ K)0 if and only if 〈1 ⊕ x′, z〉 ≤ 0 for
each x′ ∈ K. Hence,
`(x, f) ∈ S ⇐⇒ 〈〈f ,x〉 ⊕ −f , z〉 ≤ 0 ∀z ∈ cone(1⊕K)
⇐⇒ 〈〈f ,x〉 ⊕ −f , 1⊕ x′〉 ≤ 0 ∀x′ ∈ K
⇐⇒ 〈f ,x〉 ≤ 〈f ,x′〉 ∀x′ ∈ K
Of course, this can be achieved by setting x = arg minx∈K〈f ,x〉, and hence we are done.
Proof of Proposition 2. First notice that we require the halfspace-satisfiability condition for S to ensure that
the “halfspace oracle” in Algorithm 2 exists. Because we are selecting θt in K ⊂ cone(S)0, θt defines a
halfspace containing S and hence we can use our halfspace oracle to find an xt satisying 〈θt, `(xt,y)〉 ≤ 0
for every y ∈ Y .
To bound DT (A), which is the distance between the point 1T
∑T
t=1 `(xt,yt) and the set S, we begin by
instead bounding the distance to cone(S). We can immediately apply Lemma 3 to obtain
dist
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(xt,yt),cone(S)
)
= max
θ∈K
〈
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(xt,yt),θ
〉
=
1
T
max
θ∈K
(
−
T∑
t=1
〈ft,θ〉
)
≤ 1
T
(
T∑
t=1
〈ft,θt〉 −min
θ∈K
T∑
t=1
〈ft,θ〉
)
=
1
T
RegretT (A) (10)
where the first inequality follows by the halfspace oracle guarantee. Of course, if we let S′ ⊂ Rd−1 be the
set S after removing the first coordinate, then we see by Lemma 4 that for any z ∈ Rd−1,
dist(1⊕z, S) = dist(z, S′) ≤ (1+‖S′‖)dist(1⊕z,cone(1⊕S′)) ≤ (1+‖S‖)dist(1⊕z,cone(S)).
(11)
By assumption, however, we can write 1T
∑T
t=1 `(xt,yt) = 1⊕ z for some z ∈ Rd−1. Combining this with
equations (10) and (11) finishes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. Applying Lemma 3 to the definition of DT (A) gives
DT (A) ≡ dist
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(xt, ft), S
)
= max
w∈cone(1⊕K) , ‖w‖≤1
〈
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(xt, ft),w
〉
(12)
Notice that, in this optimization, we can assume w.l.o.g. that ‖w‖ = 1, or w = 0. In the former case we
can write w = 1⊕x‖1⊕x‖ for some x ∈ K, and we drop the latter case to obtain the inequality
DT (A) ≥ max
x∈K
〈
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(xt, ft),
1⊕ x
‖1⊕ x‖
〉
=
1
T
max
x∈K
(∑T
t=1〈ft,xt〉 −
∑T
t=1〈ft,x〉
)
‖1⊕ x‖
≥
1
T
(∑T
t=1〈ft,xt〉 −
∑T
t=1〈ft,x∗〉
)
‖1⊕ x∗‖ ≥
1
T RegretT (A)
1 + ‖K‖ ,
where we set x∗ := arg minx∈K
∑T
t=1〈ft,x〉.
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B A generalization of Blackwell to convex functions
Consider the following generalization of Blackwell to functions. In analogy to Blackwell, let:
1. A two-player game with functions as payoffs. For strategies i, j we have that the payoff of the game
l(i, j) ∈ S is a function (rather than a vector as in Blackwell).
2. S - set of functions S : {f : Rd 7→ R} ⊆ F .
3. ”Halfspaces”, which are characterized by x ∈ Rd. The halfspace Hx contains all functions f such
that f(x) ≤ 0.
4. An oracle O : Hx 7→ p which maps a halfspace containing S, i.e. ∀f ∈ S, f(x) ≤ 0, into a distri-
bution over player strategies, such that the resulting loss function is contained inside the halfspace,
i.e.
∀j , l(O(x), j) = l(p, j) ∈ Hx
5. When talking of approachability we need a distance measure. If we think of f(x) as the ”inner-
product” between f and x, then K = {x|f(x) ≤ 0 ∀f ∈ S}, which is the ”dual” set to S, is the set
of all hyperplanes containing S. Our distance measure between a function f and S is then taken to be
the maximal inner product with any hyper-plane containing S:
d(f, S) ≡ max{0,max
x∈K
f(x)}
Note that this distance is zero for all members of S.
Then:
Theorem 7 (Blackwell generalization for functions). Given an Oracle as above, the set S is approachable.
The Blackwell method of proof is geometric in Nature, and it is not immediately clear how to generalize
it to prove the above. However, using Online Convex Optimization, the proof is a simple generalization of
the one in the previous sections:
Proof. Define the dual set to S as
K = {x|f(x) ≤ 0 ∀f ∈ S}
Define the gain function for iteration t - ft - as ft = l(pt, jt) where jt is the adversary’s strategy at iteration
t, and pt is given by the oracle as the mixed user strategy for the hyperplane parameterized by xt.
Hence, iteratively the OCO algorithm generates an xt ∈ K, which is then fed to the Oracle to obtain
pt = O(xt), which in turn defines the cost function for this iteration ft = l(pt, j). The OCO low-regret
theorem guaranties us that
max
x∗
1
T
∑
t
ft(x
∗)− 1
T
∑
t
ft(xt) ≤ εt 7→ 0
By the guarantee provided by the oracle, we have that ft(xt) ≤ 0, which combined with the above gives
us:
d(f¯ , S) = max
x∗
f¯(x∗) = max
x∗
1
T
∑
t
ft(x
∗) ≤ εt 7→ 0
Which by our definition implies that the distance of the average gain function to the set S converges to zero.
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